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THE EVOLVING DUTY OF AN INNOCENT BUYER TO INQUIRE
INTO HIS BARGAIN UNDER SECTION 2(F) OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
When Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936, it
intended, in part, to prevent large organizations from wielding their enor-
mous buying power to obtain favored prices.2 To do so, Congress pro-
hibited sellers from charging different prices to different buyers for the
same goods except in restricted circumstances.' Contained within this
seller-directed enaotment, § 2(f)4 was included almost as an "after-
thought."5 This section makes it illegal for a buyer knowingly to induce
or receive a discriminatory price.' The notoriously vague language
1. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2. This statement is an oversimplification since the legislative history of § 2(f)
reveals a confused congressional understanding of the evils that the provision was de-
signed to correct. F. RowE, PRIc- DIscRimiNATIoN UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr
24 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Rows]. It is clear that the Act was prompted by fears
of abuse of the "large buying power," specifically retail chains accused of coercing lower
prices from suppliers. See 79 CONG. REc. 9078 (1935) ; FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE
CHAIN-STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-28 (1935) [herein-
after cited as FINA& REPORT]. It is also clear that the victim to be protected was the
small, independent retailer, unable to match the buying power of the chains and allegedly
on the brink of extinction. RowE, supra, at 12-17; Hearings Before the House Comn. on
the Judiciary on Bills to Anend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935). Be-
yond this, little is certain.
3. These exemptions are contained in 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970).
5. RowE, supra note 2, at 421. Although § 2(f) was included on the floor of the
Senate, there was precious little debate over the measure. The only comment on the
floor concerning § 2(f) was that it seemed "sound in principle." 80 CoNG. REc. 6428
(1936). Only Representative Utterback, in presenting the report of the conference com-
mittee, addressed himself to the merits of the measure. He argued that § 2(f) would
enable a seller to "resist the demand for sacrificial price cuts" made by large buyers
"since it enables him to charge them with knowledge of the illegality of the discount...
Id. at 9419.
This meager record indicates that Congress may have intended to adopt § 2(f) only
as a supplement to seller's liability, possibly by enlisting wary buyers as enforcers of the
Act. But the fact remains that, while the actions of buyers led to passage of the Act,
they were not the principal subject of the legislation itself. The legislative history is
replete with -references to large predatory buyers. E.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at
25. Buyer's liability is supported by congressional intent, seller's liability by the lan-
guage of the Act.
6. Section 2(f) is deceptively brief:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is
prohibited by this section.
15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970). The prohibited character of the receipt turns on its illegality
under the seller's liability provisions. Section 2(a), the basic portion of the Act, forbids
any price discrimination by sellers among goods of "like grade and quality" where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or pre-
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of this section is a source of confusion for many buyers who may risk
liability upon receiving a price discount.' Although charged with admini-
stering the Act, the Federal Trade Commission has as yet made little
effort to define the limits of § 2 (f) liability. As a result, most businesses
must operate in a perpetual state of uncertainity as to the legality of many
trade practices.
This note will discuss conditions under which a buyer has the duty of
inquiring into legality of a profferred price. This duty hinges on a
proper interpretation of the major elements of a § 2 (f) prima facie case-
competitive injury and scienter.8
COMPETITIVE INJURY
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits only those price
discriminations' having competitive impact." Thus, under § 2(f) the
buyer who knowingly induces or receives a discriminatory price violates
the Act only if that price may tend to lessen competition. 1 In buyer's
liability cases, the FTC usually alleges secondary-line competitive injury,
that is, injury to competitors of the favored buyer.1"
vent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered ....
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). Thus, the seller is liable if the result of his price discrimina-
tion can be considered injurious to competition, and if his price is not cost justified, that
is, if the differential is not the result of savings realized by the seller on the transaction.
Id. In addition, the seller may defend on the basis of the § 2(b) "meeting competition"
defense, which exonerates him upon a showing that his price was "made in good faith to
meet an equally low price of a competitor .... " Id. § 13(b).
7. RowE, supra note 2, at 535.
8. The myriad elements of a § 2(a) or § 2(f) prima facie case are far too numerous
to be the subject of discussion here. For example, space prohibits mention of the prob-
lems of jurisdictional reach, the requirement of "like grade and quality," and so on.
However, competitive injury and buyer's knowledge represent the two most important
elements of complaint counsel's prima facie case under § 2(f), and also present the most
formidable conceptual difficulties. As one commentator has noted:
Thus, the buyers' prima facie violation arises upon proof that the discriminatory
concession in his favor was sizable enough to create competitive injury, and
that furthermore the nature of the discrimination placed him on notice of its
probable illegality.
RowE, supra note 2, at 438 (emphasis in original).
9. A discrimination in price is merely a difference in price between two or more
purchasers. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
11. RowE, supra note 2, at 124.
12. 4 J. vox KAmINOwsKr, ANTITRUST LAwS AND TRADE REGULATION 29-6 (1969).
The various components of competitive injury are often difficult to unravel. Essentially,
the forms include primary-line (injury among competing sellers), secondary-line (corn-
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There is substantial, though not unamious, agreement that the Act
is designed to protect overall market competition, and not individual
competitors.'3 Therefore, minor price differentials which place one com-
petitor in a slightly better position than another are usually considered
a fact of commercial life not worthy of Robinson-Patman scrutiny. 4 For
this reason, the FTC was reluctant to move against transactions involving
slight differences in prices. Early § 2 (a) complaints were dismissed
because the differentials did not perceptibly influence resale prices, 5 or
because only a small portion of the seller's operation was involved. 6
The Supreme Court greatly altered this approach in FTC v. Morton
Salt Co.," where the respondent was charged with granting price dif-
ferentials on table salt sold to retail grocers for resale. Although the
questioned practices involved straight volume discounts theortically avail-
able to all, the Court found that, as a practical matter, only large retail
food chains, or others able to pool their buying power, were in an ecorno-
mic position to make sufficient purchases to take full advantage of the
discounts. The Court first asserted that the Act protected individual com-
petitors, as well as competition as a whole."8 It then squarely faced the
seller's argument that the injury was insignificant. Since those injured
were independent competitors of retail grocery chains, respondent pointed
to the minute effect of the receipt of a lower price for table salt, only
one item among the entire inventory of a grocery store. Justice Black
summarily rejected the argument:
There are many articles in a grocery store that, considered
separately, are comparatively small parts of a merchant's stock.
peting buyers), and third-line (buyer's customers). See generally RowE, supra note 2,
at 124.
13. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961) ; RoVE,
supra note 2, at 129. However, the legislative history is not so clear, see 80 CONG. REc.
9417 (1936), and the competition-competitors dichotomy has proved in practice to be
little more than a term of art. One problem is that the distinction is often impossible to
make, since injury to competition necessarily implies injury to competitors. As a result,
the willingness of courts to uphold findings of competitive injury often turns on the
label one chooses to place on the fact situation.
14. See C. EDWAIws, THE PluciE DisCIMINATION LAW 637 (1959).
15. See, e.g., Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537, 544 (1937).
16. See, e.g., Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548, 553 (1937). See also RowE, supra
note 2, at 132.
17. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
18. The Court stated:
fIn enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress was especially concerned with
protecting small businesses which were unable to buy in quantities. . . . The
new provision, here controlling, was intended to justify a finding of injury to
competition by a showing of "injury to the competitor victimized by the dis-
crimination."
Id. at 49, quoting S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
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Congress intended to protect a merchant from competitive
injury attributable to discriminatory prices . . . whether the
particular goods constituted a major or minor portion of his
stock. Since a grocery store consists of many comparatively
small articles, there is no possible way effectively to protect
a grocer from discriminatory prices except by applying the
prohibitions of the Act to each individual article in the store. 9
According to this statement, a reduced price for one component of a
competitor's business injures the competitor, and therefore competition.
The unarticulated assumption behind Morton Salt is that any selective
decrease in the price of a product must necessarily benefit the favored
purchaser to the detriment of his competitors." A failure to find com-
petitive injury in situations like Morton Salt would permit deliberate and
open price discriminations, as long as only one or a few ttems were in-
volved at one time. In effect, retailers could mask a price discrimination
in a large inventory with impunity. Although there is understandable
reluctance to apply § 2(f) where differentials are extremely small,
Jtftice Black's analysis permits, a findir of competitive injury only
when the differential on an individual item is significant.2
The Morton Salt approach to secondary-line injury was not enthu-
siastically accepted by lower courts.2" Courts were willing to infer com-
petitive injury without a showinfg of an overall effect on resale prices only
when "a producer is selling a homogenous product,. . . where competi-
tion is extremely keen among retailers, and where margins of profit or
markups are small .
Three years later, the same issue was presented to the Seventh
Circuit in a different factual context in Minneapolis-Honeywell Regu-
lator Co. v. FTC.24 Minneapolis-Honeywell manufactured and sold
19. 334 U.S. at 49.
20. The economic foundations of this assumption have been cogently criticized.
See generally Austern, Presumption and Percipience About Competitive Effect Under
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 81 HARv. L. REv. 773, 775-77 (1968). The argument often
advanced is that random price differentials positively benefit competition by encouraging
buyers to seek lower prices. Yet the Robinson-Patman Act was directed at decidedly
nonrandom differentials granted a certain class of buyers-chain stores. See RowE, spra
note 2, at 13-16. See generally Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 50 (8th Cir.
1956), affd, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
21. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50 (1948).
22. RowE, supra note 2, at 133-36.
23. Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 962 (1959), rezld on other grounds, 294 F.2d 465
(5th Cir. 1961) ; accord, Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959) ; Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957).
24. 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
INDIANA LAW JO URNAL
heating control units to other manufacturers who incorporated them
into oil burners. The burners were then resold to customers. Although
the price of the controls was the largest single item in the finished
burners, it appeared from the record that sorne of the disfavored pur-
chasers were able to sell their completed burners at lower prices than
favored purchasers. On this basis, the Seventh Circuit found no com-
petitive injury.25 The court noted that Minneapolis-Honeywell's prices
were generally higher than those of competitors, and that some of
Minneapolis-Honeywell's customers also purchased competitive con-
trols.2" However, for the court, the most important question was causa-
tion. It stated:
[T]here is little, if any, relationship between the prices of the
controls and the prices of the burners into which the controls
are built ....
[W]here the controls were used in the manufacture of
burners, the cost of which was determined by many other
factors-cost of other materials and parts, service, advertising,
to mention only a few--it cannot be said that discriminatory
price differentials subtanitially injure competition or that
there is any reasonable probability or even possibility that they
will do so.27
In short, the court held that price differentials become insignificant
in products destined for manufacture when they are too difficult to trace
to the finished product because of intervening variables. Therefore, a
price differential bears no relation to competitive injury unless it is
reflected in the resale price and can be clearly identified. Since prices of
manufactured products are always subject to numerous cost variables,
the price of even the single most expensive item will not determine the
resale price of the product. Thus, Minneapolis-Honeywell exempts most
sales to manufacturers from Robinson-Patman scrutiny under the guise
of lack of causal relation between price and injury.2"
The current judicial -state of affairs regarding competitive injury
reflects the tension between the potentially conflicting holdings of
25. Id. at 792.
26. Id. at 790.
27. Id. at 791-92.
28. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for late filing. Only
Justice Black dissented. On the merits, he argued that the Seventh Circuit had failed to
apply the Morton Salt doctrine. FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344
U.S. 206, 213 (1952).
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Minneapolis-Honwywell and Morton Salt. One line of cases holds that
where goods are sold for resale, the mere existence of a price differential
is usually sufficient to permit far-reaching inferences of competitive
injury.2" A second line of cases, more closely allied with Minneapolis-
Honeywell, exists where the price-differentiated product is not so easily
traceable.'
These two lines of cases leave courts which are trying to interpret
the competitive injury requirement with little direction, especially where
the issue of causality is injected. It is widely assumed that Morton Salt
and Mihweapolis-Honeywell stand for different but compatible propo-
sitions." On closer .xan-ination, however, factual distinctions melt
away. It is submitted that the twco cases are irreconcilable, that Morton
Salt represents the sounder position, and that a failure to recognize this
is partly responsible for the current confusion. While the manufacturer-
reseller distinction exists, it is without practical significance. Compare
the grocer who receives a price differential on one item in his inventory
29. In Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 959 (1965), the court upheld a finding of competitive injury with some of the
strongest language to date:
[I]t seems well-established that where the record indicates a price differential
substantial enough to cut into the purchaser's profit margin and discloses a re-
duction which would afford the favored buyer a significant aggregate saving
that, if reflected in a resale price cut, would have a noticeable effect on the de-
cisions of customers in the retail market, an inference of injury may properly
be indulged. It is unnecessary that there be evidence that th& favored customer
actually undersold his rivals; a substantial price advantage.can afford a favored
buyer a material capital advantage by enlarging his profit margin in a highly
competitive field.
We think that the tone set by the Supreme Court in the Morton Salt case
requires that we affirm the FTC's inference of a probable injury to competi-
tion in the circumstances ....
Id. at 680-81 (footnote omitted).
In United Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
926 (1966), the court adhered to Justice Black's rationale, with a proviso. The court
said that the Commission must not apply a per se test of competitive injury but must
instead be sure to draw its inferences "upon the basis of all the attendant facts and -cir-
cumstances with particular reference to the type of business under investigation." Id. at
622. But see National Dairy Prods. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.); cert. denied, 393
U.S. 977 (1968) (sustained price differential is prima facie injurious). See also General
Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965); Mid-South Distrib. v. FTC,
287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961); American Motor Specialties
v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
30. For example, the FTC adopted the Minneapolis-Honeywell rationale in Quaker
Oats Co., 66 F.T.C. 1131 (1964), where price discrimination was alleged in the sale
of oat flour used in the manufacture of various food products. The Commission used a
simple input-output analysis. Lacking a showing that the price of the oat flour (input)
was a significant factor in the price of the finished product (output), competitive injury
could not be inferred. Id. at 1191-92.
31. For analysis which cites both Minneapolis-Honeywell and Morton Salt with
approval, see RowE, supra note 2, at 182, 186-87. But cf. id. at 133.
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with the manufacturer who obtains a similar differential on one of the
component parts which will comprise his finished product. Although
the grocer receives his price break on a discrete item which may be
resold separately, at the end of the year his income statement will show
a lower cost of goods sold than it would have if no differential had been
received. Since -the manufacturer is in the same position, the result to
both is increased income. Therefore, the assumption that price dif-
ferences on raw materials are unmeasurable is invalid. The total effect
is measurable, and this is all that competitive injury requires. 2 It is
true that the grocer's differential is measured more easily. Even then,
however, the resale price may not be reduced by the amount of the dif-
ferential received. Indeed, courts following the Morton Salt rationale
have consistently agreed that competitive injury may exist even if the
resale price is not lowered at all, since increased profits due to pro-
hibited price discounts injure competition just as effectively. "
It requires no great leap of faith to see that price differentials af-
fect the competitive position of the manufacturer in the same way as the
grocer. By refusing to recognize competitive injury when a discrimi-
natory price on a component part has been hidden and cannot itself be
measured, the court blinds itself to economic reality. Minneapolis-
Honeywell is squarely inconsistent with Morton Salt and should be
overruled.
Perhaps not intending the result, Minneapolis-Honeywell and its
progeny have created a blanket exception to § 2 (f) for the manufacturer
who transforms raw materials into a finished product. The nonmanu-
facturer who resells a product, however, is not immune from § 2(f)
liability, no matter how trivial a part the item plays in his total inven-
tory. However, in light of the irrationality of the manufacturer-reseller
disitinction, the prudent manufacturer should not rely on the protection
of Minneapolis-Honeywell, and should analyze his liability as a buyer as
if the distinction did not exist.
SCIENTER-BUYER'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROHIBITED
NATURE OF THE TRAisACTION
Section 2(f) applies only to the buyer who knowingly induces or
32. The teaching of Morton Salt is that small price differentials on individual
products nay support a finding of competitive injury. This doctrine was not challenged
by Minneapolis-Honeywvell; the disagreement between the two cases involves the identifi-
cation, not the significance, of the competitive impact.
33. See, e.g., E. Edelman & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 941 (1958). See also Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955 (1959), rev'd on other grounds,
294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1961).
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knowingly receives an illegal price discrimination."' In theory, the range
of culpable buyers is wide since both the buyer who seeks the illegal
discount and the buyer who possesses sufficient facts to lead him to suspect
illegality could be liable. If the provision swept this widely, it would
be the rare purchaser who was not guilty of a § 2(f) violation. If the
provisions of this Act are to be realistically enforced and obeyed, buyers
must have a reliable indication of what transactions are permissable under
§ 2(f).
Automatic Canteen
The Supreme Court has dealt with the § 2(f) scienter requirement
only once in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC." The Court rejected the
Commission's contention that the buyer need have knowledge only that
his price was lower than that of his competitors. Instead, it held that the
FTC must show that the buyer received a price which he knew to be
illegal to the seller under § 2(a)."
Since many § 2 (f) cases involve the buyer's assertion of the seller's
defense that the price was cost justified," the Court appeared to a place
seemingly insurmountable burden on the Commission to produce evidence
that the buyer knew his seller's price Was not cost justified. 8 In the case
where a buyer purchases in the same quantities and is serviced in the
same manner as competitors, Justice Frankfurter suggested that the FTC
could meet its burden and scienter could be inferred from a showing that
the buyer knew that he received the same goods and services for a lower
price.3" In the more difficult cases where goods or services differ, the
inference is permissible upon a showing that the buyer was aware of
the nature of the differences and could not reasonably have believed that
these differences warranted a lower price."
After an hiatus of several years, the FTC began new proceedings in
34. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 73 (1953).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 71.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). In addition, the buyer may interpose his seller's
§ 2(b) meeting competition defense, or any other defense which the seller could have
introduced in a seller's liability action. See RowE, supra note 2, at 445.
38. At worst, the Commission would be required to compile cost studies for each
litigation, a time-consuming process. But see Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 73 F.T.C.
1269 (1968) (Commission need come forward with a showing only that buyer should
have known that his differential could not have been cost justified, regardless of cost
justification in fact).
39. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 80 (1953).
40. Id. It should be noted that in both of these situations, the Commission need not
always show that the buyer was aware of every element of § 2(a) and § 2(f) illegality.
See, e.g., Mid-South Distrib. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
838 (1961). But cf. RowE, supra note 2, at 444 n.115.
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the late 1950's to test § 2(f) requirements in the light of Automatic
Canteen. Subsequent litigation has shown additional circumstances in
which the buyer may be charged with notice of the illegality of the
transaction.
Buyer's Actions Extrinsic to the Transaction
'When buyers attempt to organize into groups primarily for the
purpose of obtaining quantity discounts, such activity may support
inferences of scienter by a trier of fact. For example, after Automatic
Canteen, the FTC brought complaints against confederations of automo-
bile parts jobbers formed for the purpose of using their pooled buying
power to obtain volume discounts.4 The groups usually passed on the
discounts to members in the form of year-end rebates.
Where the buying groups served merely as a conduit for the proces-
sing of members' orders and disbursment of rebates, the FTC and the
courts had little trouble finding liability. In American Motor Specialties
v. FTC,42 for example, a buying group which existed ordy as a name on
a letterhead was held by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to create
no cost savings for sellers, and knowledge of this fact was charged to
members. 3
After a series of reversals, buying groups began to develop more
sophisticated operations, such as providing warehousing and brokerage
services. In Alhambra Motor Parts" the Commission held that com-
plaint counsel had met its § 2(a) burden by a showing that savings
realized by the seller, including those resulting from the warehousing
service, did not justify the lower price. Scienter could be inferred,
according to the majority, from the fact that certain jobbers had made
41. E.g., General Auto Supplies, Inc. v. FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1965) ; Mid-
South Distrib. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961) ; Amer-
ican Motor Specialties v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
Buying group litigation has been well covered in: Kintner, Romano & Filippini,
Cooperative Buying and Antitrust Policy: The Search for Competitive Equality, 41 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 971, 973-98 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Cooperative Buying] ; Mezines,
Group Buying-When is it Permitted Under the Robinson-Patman Act?, 44 N.Y.U.L.
Rxv. 729 (1969) ; Steele, Caveat Emptor Under the Rob ison-Patnzan Act-A Reappraisal
of Current Developments in Buyer's Liability, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 19 (1966). It should be
noted that buying groups may serve more than this function. See Cooperative Buying,
supra, at 972.
42. 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960).
43. Id. at 228.
44. 68 F.T.C. 1039 (1965). Here, the group made its own purchases on a quantity
basis, stored the goods in its warehouse, and resold them to members who received an
annual rebate in proportion to purchases. Members were free to buy elsewhere, but few
did so. In essence, all the members had done was to buy, using another name nominally
entitled to the discount. Sellers were able to sell more to a single "buyer" (the group)
but sold no more than if the group had never existed.
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purchases from the same suppliers before joining the buying group; and
therefore could easily compare their bargains. 45 The inference of know-
ledge was also supported by the members' general trade experience.4 6
This was held to meet the requirements of Autonzatic Canteen in the
absence of a formal cost study.4
It can be concluded from this line of cases that buyers who join
or create an artificial organization for the purpose of obtaining a lower-
price will likely be held to possess the requisite scienter for § 2 (f) liability.
Inducement of Price Discounts
Fred Meyers, Inc. v. FTC" was the Commission's first attempt to
enforce § 2(f) against an individual buyer since Automatic Canteen.
In Fred Meyer, petitioner, a grocery chain in Oregon, had for many
years conducted an annual promotion sale. Coupon books were printed,
containing discount offers for goods in Meyer's stores, and Meyer
actively solicited suppliers to place advertisements in the books at the
rate of 350 dollars per page. These payments in the aggregate covered
the total cost of the promotion, including the discounts to the customers.'
Faced with an FTC claim that the cash payments constituted a prohibited
price discrimination, Meyer argued that because of differing quantities
purchased by competitor 9 it had no reason to know of the illegality
of the suppliers' payments.
In rejecting Meyer's claim, the Ninth Circuit noted three prominent
findings of the Commission: (1) none of Meyer's suppliers granted
quantity discounts to anyone else; (2) Meyer received the discount
only one month of the year;"3 (3) many of the rebates res~lted in
prices substantially less than normal. These facts were held sufficient
to satisfy the Commission's burden as to buyer's knowledge that the
discounts could not be cost justified, even without a formal cost study."
Here, scienter was a function of trade experience, but the court was careful
45. Id. at 1083.
46. Id. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953), permits use of evi-
dence of "trade experience" only with reference to facts of the particular case. Id. at
79-80. Here, the Commission was willing to recite the phrase, without support or quali-,
fication.
47. Justice Frankfurter had stated: "A showing that the cost differences are very
small compared with the price differential and could not reasonably have been thought to
justify the price difference should be sufficient." Id. at 80.
48. 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
49. Fred Meyer, Inc., was the second largest seller of all goods in the area. Id. at
355.
50. The court labeled an inference as "fair" that Meyer's larger sales during the
month generated no appreciable cost savings. Id. at 364.
51. Id. at 367.
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to point to specific facts which Meyer had particular reason to know, in-
cluding profit margins of various wholesalers and retailers, and pricing
theory in the retail market. Meyer also possessed a "vigorous intelligence
network" which supplied it with current information about prevailing
prices and practices of competitors.52 On this basis, the court concluded
that Meyer had reason to know of the probable effects of its promotional
activities.5"
Fred Meyer presented an easy fact situation for the Commission.
Meyer solicited special, localized, annual price differentials from suppliers
who did not otherwise grant them. Meyer's trade experience was genu-
inely substantial, which should have enabled the firm to detect threshold
illegality. At a minimum, this justified the Commission in shifting the
burden to Meyer on the issue of knowledge of cost justification, a burden
Meyer failed to discharge.54 This indicates that extensive buyer's
knowledge will considerably ease the Commission's burden of producing
evidence, and might in itself support a judgement.
Fred Meyer demonstrates that both a buyer who knowingly induces
an illegal price and a knowledgeable buyer who receives a suspicious
price will be found to possess the requisite scienter. As in tort law, the
exceptional individual will often be held to a higher standard of care."
In Fred Meyer, both inducement and specialized knowledge were present,
making the Commission's case particularly strong.
Misrepresentation
Beatrice Foods Co." presented the Commission with an especially
complex fact situation. The Kroger Company, a multistate grocery store
chain, sought bids from private dairies for a supply of milk and other
dairy products to be marketed under the Kroger label. During the course
of negotiations with Beatrice, the Kroger bargaining agent, Mr. Francis
X. Casserly, rejected an offer of an across-the-board fifteen percent dis-
count on the milk alone, stating that a competitor (Broughton) had al-
ready submitted a similar bid containing a twenty percent discount.
52. Meyer carefully monitored the advertising of competitors, engaged in compari-
son shopping at competitive stores and tested the quality of goods sold elsewhere. Id.
53. Id.
54. The court stated:
Meyer suggests but failed to prove that its sales during the balance of the year
were significantly lower. Such a failure to introduce evidence within its pos-
session probably strengthens and certainly cannot weaken the Commission's
conclusion.
Id. at 364 n.14.
55. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
56. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 119,045 (FTC 1969), aff'd sub
norn. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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The Commission found that Broughton's bid was not as Casserly de-
scribed, although comparisons were admittedly difficult to make due
to differences in the manner of calculating bids. Beatrice's bid was based
on an average price for all locations to be served; other bids, such as
Broughton's, were broken down on a location-by-location basis." Further
negotiations led to an offer by Beatrice containing a discount slightly
greater than the twenty percent figure quoted by Casserly. This was
accepted on a "stripped service" basis: Kroger, not Beatrice, would
actually stock the shelves at the times of delivery.
On the basis of precedent, Kroger's position seemed strong. First,
Kroger was served in a different manner than its competitors; second,
Beatrice had a potentially successful § 2(b) meeting, competition de-
fense; 8 and third, the bids were not directly compaxable. Thus the
Commission was faced with a dilema. It seemed unfair to hold Beatrice
liable for § 2 (a) violation, since it had relied on Casserly's statement of
competitive bids. On the other hand, if Beatrice were absolved, Kroger
would seemingly be absolved from § 2(f) liability, since the price re-
ceived would no longer be prohibited by § 2(a).
The Commission resolved this conflict in unprecedented fashion.
Casserly knew the Beatrice bid was substantially below others, and testi-
fied to this effect.59 He was portrayed as a shrewd negotiator, experi-
enced in private label operations, and determined to obtain the best pos-
sible price. Most important, he failed to keep the bidders properly in-
formed, and actually misrepresented Broughton's bid as lower than it
actually was."
The Commission therefore exonerated Beatrice by virtue of the
meeting competition defense." Even though Beatrice's bid was lower
than competitors and thus did more than meet competition, the majority
held that the difficulty in comparing the various bids, and Beatrice's
justified doubt as to whether its final bid was sufficiently low were enough
to give it a successful defense. For Kroger, however, the majority added
that Beatrice's success "does not mean . . . that everyone is to be ex-
cused."62 The opinion then addressed the issue of "whether Kroger
57. Id. at 21,299. Since the bids were not precisely comparable, there is some
question whether Casserly was actually aware of the misrepresentation. Scher, New
Directions in Buyer's Liability Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 39 ANTITRUST L.J. 884,
891 (1970).
58. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 21,299. The meeting competi-
tion defense is explained in note 6 supra.
59. Id. at 21,301.
60. Id. at 21,307-08.
61. Id. at 21,309.
62. Id. at 21,311.
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stepped over the bounds of proper negotiation.""3  Emphasizing the
element of inducement in § 2(f), the Commission found that:
Kroger bargained too hard . . Normally the seller must bear
the responsibility for seeing that Robinson-Patman require-
ments are complied with. At some point, however, if the buyer
continues to push, he must become liable if Robinson-Patman
bounds ard exceeded. And this is so even though the seller has
lived up to his Robinson-Patman obligations by maintaining
the good faith required for a Section 2(b) defense. 4
When Casserly, as representative of a powerful buyer, made misrepre-
sentations of fact concerning competitive bids without first checking his
assumptions for their accuracy, Kroger took on the risk of liability. A
contrary holding, said the Commission, would render § 2(f) meaning-
less. 5
The cost justification issue was resolved adversely to Kroger largely
on the basis of Casserly's trade experience. Casserly had thorough
knowledge of the industry and the subject matter of the negotiation.
Although warned by other bidders of cost justification problems, he
nonetheless accepted Beatrice's bid. This, said the Commission, was
sufficient to place him on notice that this unusual bid, clearly unrelated
to delivery costs, could not be cost justified in fact.6
The Sixth Circuit affirmed in Kroger Co. v. FTC." It concluded:
To hold otherwise in this case would put a premium on the
buyer's artifice and cunning in inducing discriminatory prices
... . [and] would violate the purposes of the Act, and
frustrate the intent of the Congress. 8
There can be no denying that the Sixth Circuit has judicially rewrit-
ten the language of the Robinson-Patman Act, at least as it has been
63. Id.
64. Id. at 21,312. The "stripped service" portion of the contract was held to give
Beatrice negligible cost savings. Id. at 21,307.
It is unclear to what extent the holding rested on the standards set forth in the Com-
mission's interlocutory holding in Suburban Propane Gas Corp., 73 F.T.C. 1269 (1968).
If that decision was correct (that the Commission need not show absence of cost justifi-
cation in fact, only that buyer should have known there probably was none), then the
decision in Beatrice fits easily into that mold. Suburban Propane Gas Corp. was cited in
the Beatrice majority opinion. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE RFG. REP. at 21,312.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 21,313.
67. 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
68. Id. at 1377.
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interpreted since Automatic Canteen. 9 But the Act has undergone
judicial surgery before,"0 and the result in the Kroger case seems quite
defensible, especially since Justice Clark limited liability to active mis-
representation. He stated:
The use by the Commission of the "hard bargaining" language
. . . is but a warning, not a command. The controlling point
here is not the "hard bargaining" nor the["]price levels" but
the misrepresentation of the Broughton bid, in order to induce
a discriminatory price.'
If one of the goals of statutory construction is to furnish parties with
comprehensible terms explaining the requirements of the law, then
Justice Clark is surely correct.
More recent actions by the FTC appear to enlarge buyer's liability
along the lines of Beatrice-Kroger. The proposed complaint in The Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co."2 would extend the Beatrice-Kroger doctrine
of misrepresentation to situations where the buyer remains silent upon
receipt of an offer known to be too far below other competitive bids
to be meeting competition. The Commission in that case issued its
complaint because "A & P accepted Borden's offer knowing that Borden
had granted a substantially lower price than the only other competitive
bidder and without notifying Borden of this fact." 3  This view of
§ 2 (f) would go far toward creating a buyer's requirementof disclosure.
In the recent case of United Fruit Co.,7 respondent, an importer-
seller, furnished Harbor banana distributors with direct deliveries to
Harbor's processing plant, rather than from United's regular discharge
point. This beiefit resulted in a savings to Harbor in trucking costs,
and constituted the alleged discrimination. On the basis of the meeting
competition defense, the hearing examiner found no § 2 (a) liability on
69. This was vigorously asserted in Kroger's unsuccessful petition for certiorari.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 17, Kroger Co. v. FTC, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). But see
Brief for the Federal Trade Commission in Opposition at 13-14, Kroger Co. v. FTC, 404
U.S. 871 (1971) which argued:
The language of Section 2(f) supports this conclusion .... from Kroger's
point of view the price it sought was in fact unlawful, even though the person
offering that price did not thereby violate the Act.
Id.
70. Borowitz, Beatrice Foods: Meeting Competition and Buyer Liability, 22 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 54, 61-62 (1970).
71. 438 F.2d at 1378 (emphasis in original).
72. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f1 19,639 (FTC 1971).
73. Id. at 21,685. For an opinion that this case may represent a shift in enforce-
ment, see Rowe, Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 98, 103-04
(1971).
74. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REa. REP. ff 20,209 (FTC 1973).
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the part of United, and therefore exonerated Harbor from § 2 (f) liability.
The Commission reversed, 75 arguing that Harbor, like Casserly, was a
knowledgeable buyer, that it knew its own trucking costs, and that its
competitors were not benefited by similar direct delivery. The only
reference to misrepresentation was the allegation that Harbor had threat-
ened to take its business elsewhere unless granted direct delivery, a threat
it did not intend to keep."'
This analysis stretches the Kroger holding to its limits by extending
the concept of misrepresentation beyond Justice Clark's framework."
In Kroger it was an actual misstatement of a previously quoted price that
caused Beatrice to make its lower offer. The misrepresentation in United
Fruit involved merely an application of pressure in the course of bargain-
ing. This holding would make any falsehood a sufficient ground for a
§ 2(f) violation if the subsequent price discrimination is in any way
related.
As should be clear, the consequence of misrepresentation are being
increasingly borne by the buyer. The real issue, though, is the definition
of misrepresentation. Under Beatrice-Kroger and United Fruit, any
misstatement made during the course of negotiations which results in
the granting of a price differential may subject the buyer to § 2(f)
liability, regardless of the liability of 'the seller under § 2(a). The
sweep'of the term is broad, but its message is clear: refrain from false-
hoods in communications with potential suppliers. Further, A & P may
require the buyer to reject bids which are too low, and affirmatively notify
the seller of the reasons for the action. Under this interpretation, it
appears that the FTC has ignored the admonitions of Justice Clark in
Kroger, instead adhering to its earlier Beatrice rationale of hard bargain-
ing.
The Buyer's Course of Action
Various factual circumstances surrounding the transaction may
place even the innocent buyer on notice of probable § 2(f) illegality.
In the group buying cases, it was the artifice of the buying instrumen-
tality; in Fred Meyer, trade experience and inducement; in Beatrice-
Kroger and subsequent cases, some variant of misrepresentation.
But notice of illegality is only half the buyer's problem. Once his
suspicions are aroused, what steps can he take to avoid liability? One
possible tactic is to tailor the contract of the sale to give an appearance
75. Id. at 22,196.
76. Id. at 22,197.
77. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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of diligent inquiry. An example of this would be the insertion of a
simple statement by the seller that the price he offers is cost justified.
A more sophisticated approach was taken in Beatrice-Kroger, where the
terms of sale were actually altered from the norm by the insertion of
the "stripped service" provision, which did in fact alter costs somewhat,
though not enough to support the differentials. Neither method would
shield the buyer from a charge of knowing receipt. In both cases, the
inquiry is the same: did facts exist which would put a person with the
buyer's skill and knowledge on notice of probable illegality? In both
cases, the Commission could find that the buyer had reason to know, in
spite of the printed statement."' In fact, such a provision might serve
only to draw attention to the arrangement. Surely this sort of whistling
in the dark cannot alter the outcome as long as the issue remains what
the buyer had reason to know.
The alternative open to the buyer is to make affirmative inquiry
into the sources of his seller's price quotations whenever the circum-
stances arouse his suspicions. It is unclear how comprehensive the
inquiry must be. Consistent with so much in the Robinson-Patman Act,
the adequacy of the inquiry must turn on subjective factors such as
diligence, good faith and knowledge.
If buyers adopted inquiry as a business practice, the initial impact
on purchaser-supplier relationships might be profound. There would
be a justified fear of seller impatience with any buyer who objects to
a bargain offer. Sales might be lost as a result. But if sellers could be
convinced to supply reasonably detailed information with their offers,
the effect on -the business community could be minimized. It may be
that absolute truth in bargaining, as Commissioner Elman warned in
his dissent in Beatrice," is the only way in which buyers may avoid
Robinson-Patman prohibitions.
CONCLUSION
Section 2(f) weighs increasingly upon the knowledgeable buyer.
To avoid violating the Act the buyer must carefully scrutinize his
transaction. While standards regarding competitive injury remain an all-
or-nothing categorization,"0 scienter contains a morass of hazards which
78. For suggestions as to when the buyer may fairly be charged with constructive
knowledge, and a generally excellent analysis of the problems of buyer's liability, see
Frey, The Evidentiary Burden on Affirmative Defenses Under Section 2(f) of the Robin-
son-Patinan Act: Automatic Canteen Revisited, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 347, 368 (1967).
See also Comment, Buyers' Responsibility Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L.
REv. 273, 276 n.17 (1954).
79. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 21,316.
80. See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
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can be avoided only by diligent attention to business practice and the re-
quirements of the Act. Where the buyer acts reasonably and in good faith
to determine the legality of his transaction there is little likelihood.
even if he errs, that § 2(f) could be applied to his conduct.
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